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services” (165) seems to suggest a contrast with the state as a coherent actor 
handling public resources. In reality, however, Central Asian states are far from 
unitary; there are multiple sources to approach. The actual functioning recalls 
a kind of franchise system, in which multiple public officials gain licenses to 
use the state’s brand name and its resources to supply the goods and services in 
their possession, often competing with other branches of the state.
One might also wonder whether McMann’s picture really depicts coping 
strategies and corruption in Central Asia since independence (which seems 
to be the intention), or whether she essentially offers a more time-specific 
explanation of the transitional period of Central Asia in the 1990s? The bulk of 
the data was gathered in the early 2000s, and it is never clearly spelled out how 
this data may dovetail with the situation more than a decade later. The Uzbek 
case appears to be the big “elephant in the room.” Frequently reported to be 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world, where the state at the local 
level has been informalized to the extent that the formal-informal dichotomy 
very much is elusive,3 one naturally wonders whether the relatively favorable 
situation claimed to exist in Uzbekistan remains applicable. In Uzbekistan, the 
economy did not collapse to the extent seen in the neighboring countries, and 
the state remained relatively strong and more capable of exerting control and 
order. Although the inertia of the Soviet-style centralized leadership sheltered 
the country from the worst shocks of independence, this system appears to 
have stagnated long ago with increasing resource scarcity as a result. Admit-
tedly, McMann alludes to as much in a footnote (78) but a more careful discus-
sion is necessary to determine whether Uzbekistan really represents a distinct 
sustainable alternative or if the situation described by McMann already is a 
thing of the past.
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Most observers would agree that post-Soviet states have widespread corrup-
tion. Although the Soviet-era economic practices of resource allocation have 
much to do with behavioral norms of falsification, as Timur Kuran illustrated 
3 Johan Rasanayagam, “Informal Economy, Informal State: The Case of Uzbekistan,” Interna-
tional Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 21, no. 11–12 (2011): 681–696.
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vividly in his book, Private Truths, Public Lies, the transition to capitalism 
did not eradicate moral double standards.4 Instead, clientelist institutions and 
corruption deepened further in the newly sovereign states of the former ussr. 
Why did new market institutions fail to bring more reliable and equitable 
distribution regimes? If the markets are not at fault, are some societies more 
predisposed to manipulating and cheating through corrupt practices than 
others? How are critical economic resources being allocated in environments 
where there is a high degree of informal dealings and bribery?
Kelly McMann’s book, Corruption as a Last Resort, provides a sophisti-
cated and well-grounded analysis on the causes and outcomes of petty cor-
ruption through a literature survey and empirical findings from Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Her analysis is enriched with extensive readings 
on political economy, international relations, and development economics. 
McMann suggests that corrupt behaviors are neither innate nor are they prized 
by Central Asian societies. They cannot solely be associated with state practice 
or opportunistic officialdom, either. Individuals resort to diverse forms of brib-
ery, favoritism and clientelism to survive, given the highly uneven distribution 
of public goods and market opportunities. Scarcity leads to intense competi-
tion among different stakeholders. Corruption is simply a response, as well as 
a tool, to get ahead of others when such goods and opportunities are limited, 
and alternative institutions for distribution and allocation do not exist. Thus, 
petty corruption is dependent on market distortions and poor institutional 
settings lacking more equitable alternatives.
The first two chapters provide an excellent start as McMann forcefully illus-
trates that the lack of alternatives is a more fruitful scholarly approach to pro-
vide international comparisons and to take into account different institutional 
variations on markets and governance. The critical effects of market reform on 
corruption emerge when Central Asia’s states are compared with one another. 
A further analysis on what different “alternatives” would mean and additional 
comparisons would have deepened the analysis. Another factor that deserves 
attention is how information asymmetries about access and knowledge have 
played a role in identifying and capitalizing on alternatives.
McMann presents her evidence on bribery, favoritism, and clientelism from 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the third chapter. This analysis is based on field 
interviews and a regional large-scale survey. Her data illustrate that most citi-
zens consider the state primarily as an arena for competition. They seek the 
assistance of state officials at different levels of administration, especially at 
4 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification 
(Cambridge ma: Harvard University Press, 1995).
0002694956.INDD   200 3/2/2016   3:14:18 PM
 201Book Discussions
central asian affairs 3 (2016) 193-207
301678
the local level. Without market-enhancing institutions, individuals secure 
favoritism through connections and bribery. Chapter four examines how the 
weaknesses of market actors and market-enhancing institutions emerge as 
an unrealized alternative. The two countries went through extensive market 
liberalization through privatization, deregulation, and broader integration 
into world markets without having fully established market-enhancing institu-
tions such as well functioning competition laws, regulatory institutions, and 
financial systems. In this economic context, McMann argues, neither market 
actors nor governments have been able to produce services and goods to meet 
everyone’s basic needs, so citizens resort to multiple channels of access to 
obtain them. The contrasting case is Uzbekistan, a non-reformer, where indi-
viduals receive basic state provision without competing and, McMann sug-
gests, there is less corruption. Most citizens surveyed see the state as the guar-
antor of goods and services. This is a highly confusing conclusion that I will 
address further below.
The following two chapters examine the role of Islamic institutions and 
 secular charities and the uneven effect of market reform on families. These 
sections provide less rigorous data or fieldwork evidence on the degree of sup-
port these institutions provide. The dramatic rise in the number of mosques 
points out the gradual emergence of a new political and social space that has 
to be taken seriously in institutional analysis of alternative markets. Business 
interests get short shrift here. Further analysis on enterprising activities by 
families would have helped to put corruption in a context of different patron-
age and exchange regimes and would have enriched McMann’s arguments in 
relation to market players and alternative institutions.
The final section on policy recommendations to reduce corruption rests on 
the assumption that providing citizens with alternatives to corruption can be 
an effective anti-corruption strategy. I agree with McMann’s dismissal of those 
who suggest downsizing the state can reduce the amount of resources con-
trolled by officials and thus would cut back corruption opportunities. However, 
her notion of increasing alternatives rests on implicit assumptions of having a 
benevolent state, abundant resource endowments (unless captured elsewhere 
through expansionist policies), and a non-Hobbesian society. On this pessimis-
tic note I turn to more substantive matters.
While recognizing the original contribution of the book on corruption 
in Central Asia, I would like to highlight a few disagreements I have with 
McMann’s analysis. At the theoretical level, I find seeking a relationship be-
tween corruption and marketization and liberalization is problematic. I tend 
to agree that market liberalization opens wider possibilities for corruption; 
there is much evidence from China in this respect. However, the analysis can 
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be more meaningful when corrupt practices are measured in relation to scale, 
form, and different institutions of clientelism. That is to say, corruption under 
single-party authoritarian rules, communist regimes, and weak democracies 
all have different structural patterns and institutional trajectories. Absence 
of alternatives may only be a conceptual framework for petty corruption, 
but what are its implications for a broader corruption analysis? Abundance 
of market provisions may be curtailing other forms of large-scale corruption. 
For example, how does the absence of alternatives apply to lobbying activities 
of corporations at government level for policy changes? How about the lucra-
tive procurements grabbed by politically connected firms in mature capital-
ist economies? Second, corruption analysis in the context of the state and/
or a specific geographical unit needs further questioning in relation to alloca-
tion and distribution regimes in multiple zones of space and time. The recent 
special issue of Central Asian Survey on “Offshore Central Asia” illustrates that 
the region’s economic assets and natural resources are increasingly integrated 
into global value networks.5 Offshore accounts and money transactions show 
a complex interplay among multiple actors involving the region’s ruling elites, 
new business classes, and Western financial and legal institutions across mul-
tiple geographical domains.
My final reservation is about the timing and the use of data. McMann ar-
gues that Uzbekistan’s continued provision of state goods and services and its 
citizens’ less severe problems with money and unemployment underscore that 
market reform reduced government assistance and exacerbated economic 
challenges in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I think this finding does not hold 
for what many researchers, including myself, have observed in Uzbekistan. My 
enterprise survey shows very high dissatisfaction levels with all major institu-
tions in the country.6 One explanation may be that McMann’s data is relatively 
old and not fully updated to support her claims today. The late 1990s and the 
early 2000s coincided with a period of relative tranquility in Uzbekistan, when 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were suffering from market transition turbulence. 
This changed from the mid-2000s. I observed deep stress in the Uzbek economy 
when I visited the country during that period and subsequently. Falsifications 
and corrupt practices were everywhere. Many lived on the income brought by 
seasonal jobs in Russia, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere. Businesses were stifled by 
oligarchic rule and a Soviet style-banking regime. Kazakhstan, on the other 
5 John Heathershaw and Alexander Cooley, “Offshore Central Asia: An Introduction,” Central 
Asian Survey, 34, no. 1 (2015): 1–10.
6 Gül B. Özcan, Building States and Markets: Enterprise Development in Central Asia (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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hand, looked totally different, more confident, less suspicious and oppressive 
than Uzbekistan. These diverging economic paths and political choices reflect 
on starkly different living standards and well-being in the region today.
Despite these critical comments, the book has many good qualities and 
I recommend it to any scholar of Central Asia, transition economics, and cor-
ruption studies.
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Much of the scholarly work on corruption has attributed the problem to gov-
ernment officials’ incentives and capacity as shaped by broad economic, po-
litical, and societal influences, such as market reform, lack of democracy, and 
culture. Corruption as a Last Resort, as Igor Logvinenko and Johan Engvall note, 
shifts the focus to average citizens, the overlooked party in illicit exchanges. 
Moreover, unlike many other works, this book not only identifies a broad influ-
ence – market reform – but also traces the causal mechanisms that link the 
broad influence to individuals’ decisions to engage in corruption. Specifically,
Market reform can undermine the ability of markets, societal groups, 
and families to provide essential goods and services when two condi-
tions are present: (1) states have previously exerted significant economic 
control and 2) reforms failed to create institutions to strengthen markets, 
such as credit registries, judicial systems, and anti-monopoly policies. 
When market reforms are introduced under these two conditions, mar-
ket actors and societal groups start from scratch with few resources and 
limited opportunities to increase them. At the same time, market reform 
reduces many families’ resources: price liberalization results in higher 
prices that drain families’ savings, and economic restructuring closes 
or downsizes inefficient enterprises that once employed family mem-
bers. Under this set of circumstances, essential goods and services are 
not readily available from markets, societal actors, and extended family. 
Simultaneously, market reform, regardless of the two conditions, elimi-
nates formal government programs, so the state provides fewer needed 
goods and services. Unable to readily obtain essential goods and services 
from markets, societal actors, extended family, or formal government 
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